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1. UNCTAD CONFERENCES: IMPOSSIBLE OBJECTIVES
If history repeats itself, as the Marxist saying has it, first
as tragedy, the second time as farce, then UNCTAD III certainly did
its best to fulfill its historical role. In 1969, the first and
founding UN Conference on Trade and Development, with Che Guevara
and Edward Heath at the rostrum, certainly made history. The develo-
ping countries, many only recently freed from colonial bondage, made
an historic challenge, demanding economic as well as political inde-
pendence. UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968 was widely agreed to have
been a tragic failure, though the hope for a generalised system of
preferences perpetuated the myth of 'realistic achievements'. At
UNCTAD III, held in Santiago this year, the delegates went through
the motions of participating in an event of great importance, but
the most perspicacious knew that they were only actors in a gigantic
farce.
It takes no radical political insight to see the paradox of
UNCTAD. The developing world pressed for it to be set up within the
UN system, believing or hoping that their numerical preponderance
organized in a block system would enable them to exert a powerful
influence on the policies of the developed world. Yet in questions
of trade and development sheer weight of numbers cannot force the
rich countries to share what they have already secured or make them
change a system which benefits them only too well. At UNCTAD III the
rich countries merely reacted to the initiatives of others.
Moral pressure has also proved singularly weak in inducing the
rich countries to accede to the demands of the poor, though it may
have played some part in persuading them to actually participate in
UNCTAD confrontations. However, little persuasion has been needed,
since the apparent willingness to negotiate usually wins the appro-
bation of public opinion and involves no commitment to change any-
thing.
*
J. Ann Zammit is an IDS Research Officer. She attended UNCTAD III
in Santiago as a delegate for Malta.
3
Most of the developed capitalist countries, united in a caucus
known as Group B, made it clear that they did not regard aid as a
form of reparations. They considered that any possible injustice in
the relationship between rich and poor had ended with independence
and the close of the colonial era. While it was admitted that cert-
ain policies of developed countries might possibly have deleterious
effects on the Third World's development possibilities, these were
invariably regarded as marginal aberrations.
The rhetoric employed by Group B differed according to the va-
rious pressures put upon them at home. But in action they were al-
most invariably united in resisting the claims of the developing
world. Nor was the process of rational discussion and debate of
much service to the poor countries, since its principal effect was
to reveal the basic contradictions that existed between them. It
sowed divisions and confusion among the Group of 77, the one group
which most needed to stand firm and united.
In addition to the oft-quoted differences of wealth, power and
socio-economic structure, the Group of 77 (actually 96 countries) is
also divided by important political and ideological attitudes. On
the one hand there are the liberals who basically share the western
capitalist philosophy. Believing in one world and a community of in-
terests, they complain that their own problems derive from the fact
that they have started a little late in the development race. A few
marginal adjustments, they argue, a little sharing out, will remedy
the situation. Recognising that moral appeals are insufficient, they
now point out that it is in the interests of the rich developed
countries to provide more aid and trading opportunities. They make
this claim, not because of the drastic political or revolutionary
consequences of not doing anything, but because they believe that
more trade generates even more trade - benefiting the rich as well
as the poor.
On the other hand, there is a growing, if small, number of
countries who uphold a more radical vision of the world system, and
explain the differences between rich and poor in terms of imperial
ism. President Salvador Allende of Chile, in his inaugural address,
spoke up for those who see the intimate relationship between the
economic system and politics. "The toil and the resources of the
poorer nations," he pointed out, "pay for the prosperity of the af-
fluent peoples. The economic, financial and trade system, as preju-
dicial to the Third World as it is beneficial to the affluent coun-
tries, is defended by the majority of the latter with fierce tenaci-
ty, through their economic might, their cultural influence and...
through armed intervention."
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The existence of these widely divergent political attitudes
added to the difficulties of formulating a common initial position
from which the Group of 77 could confront the industrialised coun-
tries. It also made it more difficult to maintain a unified stand in
the long drawn-out negotiations with the Group B countries. For ex-
ample, the majority in the Group of 77, eager to trade points with
Group B on the monetary resolution, were quick to compromise on the
more radical clauses of their original resolution which had dealt
with world monetary reform and additional participation in the IMF
by the developing countries.
At the present moment the resolutions of the Group of 77 repre-
sent the lowest common denominator. From their point of view, the
resolutions constitute quite reasonable demands. The rich countries
find them exaggerated, biased or misplaced, but not wishing to be
seen to be outrightly selfish or stubborn, they tailor their tactics
accordingly. In UNCTAD III, the attempt to deflect Third World de-
mands included a masterly show of rich world paternalism, particu-
larly on resolutions of the Group of 77 which struck too closely at
the rich, world's interests. Britain, in particular, assuming the
guise of staunch defender of world equality, acted as a principal
protector of Western capitalist interests. The resolution on debt
servicing, the British delegation warned, carried with it "a danger
of considerable inequity for the developing world itself." "Some
developing countries might benefit more than others, Britain be-
moaned when presented with the Group of 77's ideas on the SDR link.
"The poorest among the less developed countries would suffer," the
British delegate announced gloomily, if the IDA soft loans resolu-
tion were to be approved. Any idea of a 'technology bank' was "non-
sense.. and won't be of any use to them." Timely warnings of this
nature went unheeded by those who had tabled the resolution, and
who in ignorance of their own best interests had pressed ahead with
their demands. "Lack of time" and other such excuses were pleaded
regretfully to explain Group B's negative votes, its abstentions and
its inability to reach agreement on the texts provided by the Group
of 77.
Britain's 'co-hardliners' were the United States, Australia,
New Zealand and Canada - though the United States seemed to play a
relatively restrained role in committee sessions. Behind the closed
doors of Group B meetings, however, strong and blunt 'leadership'
was often exercised. It took some weeks and several bold interven-
tions before the U.S. delegates in the monetary committee learnt
that what the United States said did not automatically stand for the
whole of Group B - in particular for the smaller North Eu opean and
Scandinavian countries and the poorer and less powerful Mediterra-
nean states.
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On questions of foreign investment or anything touching private
enterprise, the United States quickly jumped into açtion whatever
the scenario, fearing perhaps that on this score its erstwhile allies
were insufficiently resolute. For example, there was an innocuous
preambular paragraph to a Group of 77 Resolution on Financial Resour-
ces, which mildly observed that "... the purpose of direct foreign
investment is to obtain economic profits and that suppliers' or pur-
chasers credits are basically intended to promote exports from the
countries granting them." The United States considered this phrase
to be very offensive. So much so, that at one point the US delega-
tion threatened to insert another subsequent preambular in this
"unbalanced resolution" which recalled and emphasized the benefit
bestowed by foreign private investment. Not even the insertion of
the word 'primarily', to make profit-seeking a less exclusive motive
for foreign investment, was sufficient to appease US discontent.
Another Group of 77 Resolution, on Foreign Private Investment and
Outflows, was also considered "unbalanced" because it lacked any
mention of the benefits, in terms of employment and technology, of
foreign investment. The United States refused to contemplate any
recommendation which even hinted at the possibility of interference
with its own private enterprises. In considering what developed mar-
ket economy countries might do to help facilitate an accelerated
transfer of technology to developing countries, the United States
found unacceptable the idea that these countries "should provide in-
centives to their enterprises to facilitate an accelerated transfer
of patented and non-patented technology.., and to employ wherever
possible local labour, experts, technicians and raw materials." To
provide incentives implied undue interference with private enterpri-
se which, delegates were told, was something the United States would
never tolerate. The Group of 77 finally had to accept a nonsense
wording in which developed countries were 'to endeavour to provide
possible incentives to their enterprises."
UNCTAD III produced no decisions to make immediate and substan-
tial changes in trade, aid or monetary matters which would benefit
the developing countries, for, without a counter-offer or concession
or credible threat, the UNCTAD confrontation mechanism cannot be
expected to produce significant results.
2. Ti-lE INBUILT DIFFICULTIES OF UNCTAD CONFERENCES
UNCTAD does not operate by majority rule. No matter how large
the majority which approves a resolution in plenary session, a nega-
tive vote, or an abstention or a formal reservation entered into the
record, means that the resolution is not binding on countries which
so register their dissent. Moreover a resolution which calls for
action by Group B governments and on which a Group B country casts a
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positive vote is not legally binding but represents agreement to
make an effort to execute the resolution's provision. This is
why both Group B and the Group of 77 struggle hard to find compro-
mise wording and an agreed text which will receive an unanimous vote
in plenary. The Group of 77 knows well that action on a resolution
by Group B will only result if Group B has registered an unqualified
positive vote, while Group B's knowledge that it is not committed by
a positive vote makes it easier to adopt a cooperative approach.
Unanimity or acclamation therefore usually indicates that a Resolu-
tion is innocuous and unimportant, with few stringent obligations. A
perfect example from UNCTAD III is the resolution on 'Special Measu-
res for the 25 Least-Developed Countries". Adopted without dissent,
it was hailed as one of IJNCTAD's greatest achievements. In fact it
commits no one to any new trade or aid measures.
Hardly a single Group of 77 Resolution escaped major modifica-
tion and substantial watering-down in the weeks of arduous 'negoti-
ation'. Even when finally presented to the plenary as "compromise"
resolutions, they often encountered Group B opposition or absten-
tion. Frequently they were rendered almost valueless by the practice
of some Group B countries of making a speech 'explaining' their
vote
Moreover, the mechanics of an UNCTAD conference and the size of
its agenda are other inbuilt difficulties which work to the disad-
vantage of the majority of developing countries. UNCTAD III had six
main Committees and three Working Groups, each responsible for one
of the main issues under discussion. Each Committee had a Contact
Group and other formal or less formal subgroups. In addition, each
of the main blocs - Group B, the Group of 77, etc. - had their own
plenary sessions as well as regional sub-groups and sub-groups for
each Commission and working party. Towards the end of a summit-level
"Aconcagua" negotiating group with sub-committees was set up to work
with UNCTAD's Secretary-General, Perez Guerrero, to resolve issues
on which the various committees and working-groups had been unable
to reach agreement. After the first few days of lengthy and for the
most part unenlightening speeches in plenary, the number of committ-
ee and sub-group meetings increased rapidly. Almost until the end of
1For a brief survey of the agreements and disagreements in UNCTAD
III's six Committees and three Working Groups, see V. Walker-Leigh,
"Was UNCTAD a failure?" The World Today, Sept. 1972, Vol. 28 no. 9.
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
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the Conference there were several dozen parallel or overlapping
sessions to be attended both day and night.
This presented few problems to the rich countries. They main-
tain large bureaucracies working full-time on most issues under dis-
cussion in UNCTAD. They could well afford to send large delegations
of well-briefed delegates and experienced conference-mongers able to
find their way through this maze. A few larger developing countries,
especially in Latin America, manage to do the same. But for the maj-
ority of developing countries the task is an impossible one. With
delegations totalling two, three, or even six, it requires a super-
human effort to keep up with the work of even two committees. The
small, poor countries cannot hope to participate on the same terms
as the larger or richer ones. Their participation is inevitably less
effective and the important side- benefits, in terms of learning and
experience, are reduced.
This situation not only works to the disadvantage f the indi-
vidual developing country but it also tends to weaken the position
of the Group of 77 as a whole. People from small delegations who
have to attend sessions outside their main area of experience are
often reticent about intervening or mistakenly divert the main busi-
ness because of lack of familiarity with the technical details or
the previous discussions in that committee. By the final sessions of
UNCTAD III, during which resolutions were reaching voting stage in
plenary, the delegations of many small developing countries had al-
ready left. Far fewer than the full complement of 96 votes (Group of
77) were registered on most of the last resolutions, and the absence
of many developing country's delegates prevented the Group of 77
from implementing their threat to revert to their original monetary
resolution during the final session.
3. UNCTAD's FALSE IMAGES
Perhaps the real farce of UNCTAD conferences is the mystifica-
tion process they entail. Whíle to public opinion in the world at
large the rich developed countries are still portrayed as keen and
willing to engage in negotiations to 'help' the poor, in the develo-
ping countries a similar and perhaps more serious process of mysti-
fication is taking place.
The delegates to UNCTAD from the developing countries are al-
most invariably part of their country's bureaucratic lite - if not
actually from the economic and power alite. Their participation in
UNCTAD not only reinforces the power of this alite, but also dis-
torts the nature of the problem between rich and poor.
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Rather conservative gentlemen from developing countries can
make nationalistic, anti-imperialist or anti-rich country speeches
in UNCTAD (though this is not reflected in the resolutions), thus
misleading the population at hone about the real nature of the bu-
reaucratic élite from which they spring. Moreover, the UNCTAD exer-
cise perpetuates the emphasis on foreign obstacles to national de-
velopment and justice for the masses, at the expense of concentra-
ting on national obstacles and national potential. How many of the
developing country delegates to UNCTAD favour national development
policies which would really improve the situation of the masses at
the expense of their own standards of living and perspectives? One
suspects very few. Actual involvement in long days and nights of
negotiating, countering the resistance of Group B countries, creates
a natural tendency to see a minor concession in the wording of a
resolution as a substantial achievement, or even a major victory.
This, and the fact that UNCTAD is designed basically to discuss the
rich-poor relationship, conveniently tends to place emphasis on the
external obstacles to development, while not advocating really major
changes in the current framework of relations between the rich and
poor countries. The continuing refusal of developed countries to mo-
dify these relationships, and their repeated emphasis on the res-
ponsibility of developing countries for devising and operating con-
trols over foreign investment and other flows may eventually goad
cynical UNCTAD delegates and lead governments into re-examining
these relationships. Hopefully, it will encourage them to look to
themselves individually and as a group to solve their development
problems
4. THE FUTURE OF UNCTAD
Whether the disaster at Santiago will prevent the holding of
one more absurd repeat performance of an UNCTAD conference one can-
not tell. There are signs that the Group B countries are becoming
increasingly doubtful about the usefulness of such jambOrees. What
was once a useful public relations exercise now has its own inbuilt
dangers.
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If one is to judge by UNCTAD III, developing countries cannot ex-
pect much tiN channelled assistance in this task. For example, the
Group 77's request for an UNCTAD advisory service in their Resolu-
tion on the transfer of technology, was firmly opposed by Group B
and in particular France, Japan and Britain, fearing, no doubt,
that developing countries might learn how to bargain with foreign
investors and technology suppliers.
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There are increasing, if still weak, divisions within Group B.
Fortunately for Group B, and unfortunately for the developing courl-
tries, the internal differences are haphazard - there is as yet no
clear pattern of polarization on any set of issues. Therefore, with
the exception of Group B's own less-developed countries along the
Mediterranean, Group B still effectively stonewalls any advance by
the Group of 77. Of course, a time may come when the developing
countries find it possible to exploit the differences within Group
B. Today it appears remote, while the United States, Britain, Euro-
pe, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, continue to uphold
their basic capitalist philosophy. Further progress in developing
common policies in the European Common Market will also render such
a tactic more difficult. Moreover, present evidence suggests that
the progressive countries which refuse to tow the hard line are more
likely to be the smaller, less powerful European countries, such as
Sweden and the Netherlands. Although their efforts are to be highly
welcomed, the impact will not be great.
Group B's interest in UNCTAD has been waning as it notes with
alarm that the UNCTAD Secretariat constitutes an increasing threat
to the interests of the developed world. The Secretariat has built
up a reputation for working hard in the interests of the developing
countries both between and during UNCTAD Conferences. Group B now
often accuses the Secretariat of not asking the right questions, and
of producing 'biased' and 'sloppy' analyses. UNCTAD studies which
provide an 'incorrect' or critical view of the present rich-poor
relationships, Group B argues, give substance to 'false' or 'imposs-
ible' demands, raising developing countries' expectatiOns unrealis-
tically.
It would now be in the interests of the developing countries to
ensure that UNCTAD's energies are not in future channelled into one
fruitless public confrontation. This is not to suggest that UNCTAD s
responsibilities should be transferred to ECOSOC, as some Group B
countries have advocated, but rather that the nature of the conf ron
tation should change.
In fact no one was left in any doubt at Santiago that the Group
of 77 wanted UNCTAD strengthened. Some of the most controversial re-
solutions, fiercely contested by Group B, sought to associate UNCTAD
with GATT and the IMF in order that the voice of the developing coun-
tries might more adequately be heard in those institutions. One Group
of 77 resolution, dealing with monetary affairs, stated that in view
of the inter-dependence beUeen problems of trade, development fi-
nance and the international monetary system, "inter-governmental or
other machinery shonid be set up to examine the inter-relationships
between the decisions being taken as well as courses of action which
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each of these three organizations decides to pursue". The intention
was that this would place UNCTAD in an authoritative position to
represent the views of developing countries in GATT and IMF. Such
proposals met the firm resistance of Group B. Even the accepted
compromise, that UNCTAD's Secretary-General should consult with IMF
and GATT and report to the meeting of the Trade and Development
Board in October on ways in which coordination could be effected,
was rendered meaningless by the qualifications of Group B. In their
view, the resolution must in no way prejudice the independence of
GATT or 1MF or result in new inter-governmental machinery.
If the strengthening of UNCTAD as an institution was not imme-
diately possible, nor the recognition of UNCTAD as the machinery
through which the Group of 77 could participate in the co-ordination
of new trade and monetary policies, UNCTAD III did provide the occa-
sion for the Group of 77 to marginally improve their position in
other important institutions and bargaining areas.
The resolution on the international monetary system, drafted by
the countries of the Group of 77, aimed among other things at
strengthening their participation in the IMF. Reforms were required,
they said, which would take their particular interests fnto account.
The entire international community should take part in decision-
making, not just the Group of Ten. Some countries - Algeria, Chile,
Peru, Sudan and Tanzania - argued strongly for the holding of a new
world monetary conference, a proposal that was also upheld by Malta
and China, appearing at UNCTAD for the first time. But the Group of
77 as a body merely recommended that until a more globally represen-
tative institution evolved, "the role of the IMP should be re-es tab-
lished and strengthened... as the main forum for debate and institu-
tion for effective decision-making."
Since the IMF itself was not in question, the Croup B countries
seemed quite happy to accept a form of words that would give the de-
veloping countries more say in its deliberations. The final compro-
mise resolution recognised the desirability of a more satisfactory
system of monetary cooperation with the widest possible participatial
of developed and developing countries.
In fact, this meant the creation within the IMF of the Group of
20. But this will not necessarily reduce the influence of the Group
of 10, especially if the developing countries fail to improve their
coordination well beyond that achieved at the meetings held before
the Santiago UNCTAD - at Lima by the Group of 77, and at Caracas by
the Group of 24 (the Finance Ministers of the Group of 77).
Another minor achievement of UNCTAD III was that it slightly
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improved the bargaining position of the developing countries at the
forthcoming trade negotiations within GATT - without their being
committed to join it. In the resolution dealing with the participa-
tion of the developing countries in the GATT negotiations, the Group
of 77 secured the inclusion of ten principles which should govern
the negotiations. The resolution also stated that "special techni-
ques, modalities and ground rules should be set up for all develop-
ing countries' full and continuous participation."
In addition, UNGTAD's own efforts to expand trade were not to
be delayed by GATT negotiations. And, in spite of Group B pressure
for its inclusion, the final resolution did not mention developing
country membership of GATT. The Group of 77 announced subsequently
that they planned to form a coordination group in Geneva to prepare
for the GATT negotiations and to formulate a joint approach. It was
established in July.
It is to be hoped that the latter move heralds a more serious
attempt on the part of the Group of 77 to prepare the ground more
thoroughly for future rounds of negotiations, perhaps taking their
cue fron the O.E.G.D. which acts as a permanent secretariat for the
rich Western countries. Preparation and cobrdination by the perma-
nent representatives in Geneva, following on short working conferen-
ces like the Lima or Garacas one, is no substitute for a more spe-
cialized permanent mechanism.
The establishment of such a mechanism would be of immense mr
portance to the smaller and poorer developing countries, who can
neither maintain a constant and wide-ranging research effort and
diplomatic network, nor afford to send a large delegation to the
present marathon conferences. Through such a "Group of 77 Secreta-
riat" the development countries could work out more fruitful ways of
negotiating over the issues with which they are concerned, steering
away from the long expensive all-purpose confrontations in which, in
spite of the noise and drama, they cannot hope to achieve success.
If bargaining sessions were on single big issues, for which the de-
veloping countries were better prepared than they are for the pres-
ent UNGTAD Gonferences it would be possible to see whether 'reason-
able' men are correct when they argue that it is possible to gain
significant concessions from the rich countries. After all, it would
then be much less easy for the rich developed countries to reject
developing country requests with polite laments like "if only we had
had more time", or "if only the resolution had been more balanced",
or that "it should be discussed in another forum."
Nevertheless, whatever adjustments are made to improve the
bargaining position of the developing countries, they are in effect
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ten years too late. International bargaining of the UNCTAD kind is
not likely to retain its present importance. Political differences
among the developing countries are likely to increase, and their
views concerning their relationship with the rich industrialized
world will so divide them that it will be inipossible to formulate
unified demands. An increasing number of radical developing count-
ries will move towards a more restricted relationship with the
developed world, while the larger, more powerful and less radical
developing countries and regional groupings will find it easier to
strike their own bilateral bargains.
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